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CONTRACTS - Parol Evidence and Standard Release Forms:

The Problem of "Boilerplate" Language - Smith v. Falke,

474 So. 2d 1044 (Miss. 1985)
FACTS

A three-car automobile accident involving Mary Smith, Daniel
J. Falke, and Guy R. Gunter occurred on the morning of December 7, 1978. Falke's car struck Mrs. Smith's automobile from the
rear, and Gunter's car in turn struck Falke's vehicle from the rear.
Mrs. Smith's car thus sustained impact from both automobiles.
The accident resulted in personal injury to Mrs. Smith and in
property damage to her vehicle. Claiming joint liability of both

Falke and Gunter for her injuries, Mary Smith filed suit against
each in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, Mississippi, on April
22, 1980.
Before the case came to trial, Mrs. Smith settled out of court
with Gunter. In satisfaction of the settlement, Gunter's insurance
carrier, Dairyland Insurance Company,' tendered to Mrs. Smith
a check in the amount of $10,000 in mid-March, 1982. Dairyland
realized some six months later that it had no release from Mrs.
Smith in its files, 2 so a release form was sent to the office of Mrs.
Smith's attorney for execution. Styled as a "Full and Final Release
of All Claims,"' the document was a standard preprinted form
I. REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AT I, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLEES AT 2, SMITH V. PALKE, 474 SO. 2ND

io44 (MIss. 1985).
liability release in favor of Gunter and Dairyland, customarily required by
2. It is unclear whether a tort
the insurer in such settlements, was executed by Mrs. Smith at the time the check was delivered. Either the
execution of the release was overlooked at the time of the settlement, or, if a release was executed then, it
matter was never introduced
somehow failed to find its way back to Dairyland's offices. Testimony as to this
at trial. An affidavit of Linda A. McDonald indicated that no release was executed. Record at 58. But an affidavit of Charliene Roermer suggested that one was executed but was subsequently lost. Record at 60.
3. The full text of the release is set forth below. Italicized portions indicate matter which was typewritten
into the text of the form by Dairyland. The date of execution was hand-written by the witness. Record at 153.
FULL AND FINAL RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS FOR AN IN SOLE CONSIDERATION of the sum of Ten Thousand
Only Dollars ($10,000.00) to me/us in hand paid by or on behalf of Mrs. Mary W, Smith of P.O. Box
2223, Gulfport, Mississippi, 39501 the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I/we the undersigned,
do hereby fully and forever release and discharge the said Guy R. Gunter, R. 3, Box 507, Gulfport, Mississippi 39501 and all others whatsoever from any and all liability whatsoever, whether joint or several,
on all claims, actions and demands whatsoever, that now exist or may hereafter accrue, and including all
claims, actions and demands whatsoever based on matters now unknown as well as known, and unanticipated as well as anticipated, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly, resulting or to result from
that certain accident on or about the 7th day of December, 1978, at or near Gulfport, Mississippi,
There are hereby discharged and released not only the person or persons, corporation or corporations,
entity or entities specifically named herein as discharged and released, but also in like manner and to the
same extent all other persons, corporations and entities whatsoever such as are classed as joint tortfeasors
under laws of Mississippi completely barring any right of action against such joint tortfeasors whether or
not named herein, and vesting in the person or persons, corporation or corporations, entity or entities specifically named herein as released and discharged, all rights whatsoever under such laws as to contribution
from any such joint tortfeasor not specifically named herein.
I/we agree that this settlement is a compromise of a claim, doubtful and disputed both as to the question
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with the name of Gunter typed in by the insurance company. Mrs.
Smith signed the release on September 21, 1982, with one of her
attorney's associates acting as witness.
Mrs. Smith did not read the text of the release prior to signing.' Rather, she assumed the execution of the release to be a routine formality given in favor of Dairyland in exchange for
satisfaction of Mrs. Smith's claim against Gunter. But in addition
to releasing Gunter from further liability, the document provided
for the release of "not only the person . . . specifically named
herein . . . but also . . . all other persons, corporations and entities whatsoever . ... "
When Mrs. Smith's suit against Falke went to trial, Falke relied upon the language of the Gunter release and claimed that its
terms served to release him from liability to Mrs. Smith. Mrs.
Smith offered parol evidence in an attempt to establish her true
intent to release only Gunter and his insurer from liability, but
the trial court refused to admit the testimony, holding the language of the release to be clear and unambiguous. The court subsequently granted Falke's motion to dismiss, and Mrs. Smith
appealed the dismissal to the Mississippi Supreme Court.
The supreme court reversed-the lower court and remanded the
case for trial upon the merits." The court's holding was two-fold:
(1) the parol evidence rule applies only to controversies between
the parties to the agreement,' and (2) a party releases only those
whom he intends to release.' Thus, since Falke was not a party
to the agreement between Mrs. Smith and Gunter, parol evidence
could be used against him, and since Mrs. Smith never intended
to release Falke, he was not released.
of liability and as to the nature, extent and permanency of any injuries and/or damage which have or has
resulted or may result from said accident; and that the payment is not to be construed as an admission
of liability.
I/we further agree that this release and payment pursuant thereto is not to be construed as a waiver by
or an estoppel of any party released to prosecute a claim or action against the undersigned for any damages
sustained.
I/we further state that I/we have carefully read the foregoing release and know the contents thereof,
and I/we sign the same as my/our own free act.
WITNESS my/our hand and seal this 21st day of September, 1982 SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE
OF:
/s/ Charliene Roermer
CAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING
fs( Mary W. Smith (Seal)
(Notary)
4. Mrs. Smith additionally argued on appeal that she erroneously signed the release. Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044 (Miss. 1985).
5. See supra note 3.
6. Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1985).
7. Id. at 1046-47.
8. Id. at 1047.
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PAROL EVIDENCE IN STANDARD RELEASE FORMS
BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

A.

Release and Covenant Not to Sue Distinguished

A release, like a covenant not to sue, is a contract, and as such
the law of contracts applies. But strictly speaking, a release and
a covenant not to sue are not one and the same. The effect of a
release, where A releases B from some liability, is recognition
by the parties that A's right to sue B is terminated. 9 The effect
of a covenant not to sue, where A promises to forebear against
B, is the recognition by the parties that A agrees not to sue B
despite the fact that A's right to sue B still exists." ° Thus a release
destroys the right of the releasor to claim further liability against
the release, whereas a covenant not to sue preserves that right
of the releasor even though the releasor promises not to exercise it.
B.

Release of One Joint Tortfeasor: The Common Law Rule

The distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue is
important insofar that at common law a release of one joint tortfeasor released all other tortfeasors. This rule is a great antiquity
in English law,11 having been established by analogy to the law
of joint tenancy." The rule's early integration into American law
is evidenced by such cases as Ruble v. Turner." The theory behind the rule is that since the aggrieved party is only entitled to
recover once for his injury, then a release given to one joint tortfeasor is an indication that compensation for the injury has been
made and that all rights to further compensation, whether from
the releasee or from any other joint tortfeasor, have been terminated.1 " Thus, once the right to sue has been extinguished as to
one party, it is extinguished as to all other parties who might be
held liable for the injury as well. Under this rule, then, a tortfeasor would rather be a party to a release than to a covenant not
to sue: under a release the matter of his liability is discharged
forever, whereas the possibility of his further liability still exists
under a covenant not to sue. In contrast, the covenant not to sue
9. 2 S. WILLISTON, A
BIN ON CONTRACTS

10. 2 S.

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 338A (3d ed. 1961); 5A A. CORBIN, COR-

§ 1238 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 284, comment (a) (1973).

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 338 (3d ed. 1961); 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN
§§ 932, 1251 (1960) (admitting only minimal practical difference between release and covenant

WILLISTON,

ON CONTRACTS

not to sue under modem law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 285, comment (a) (1973).
II. Cocke v. Jenner, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (1614).
12. 2 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 318 (Rev. Ed. 1936).
13. 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 38 (1808).
14. The earliest commentary on the rule is that of Coke, written in 1628. I COKE, THlEFIRST PART
THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 232 (a) (1628).
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is generally more attractive to the injured party since he can settle with any number of joint tortfeasors by such means. But because of the limited rights afforded to the tortfeasor under a

covenant not to sue, the injured party cannot obtain as great a
settlement as he might with a release.

In an attempt to circumvent the common law rule that the release
of one tortfeasor releases all, injured parties began to negotiate
"limited" releases by expressly reserving rights to proceed against
other joint tortfeasors. The courts saw through this subterfuge and
variously opted to ignore the limiting language"5 or hold that a
limited release amounted to a covenant not to sue. 6 Both approaches were undesirable because each ultimately failed to honor
the underlying intent of the parties in executing the release.
By the turn of the nineteenth century, the decisions dealing with
limited releases were in a state of confusion. Though the old common law rule still stood,"7 there was no consistent rationale in the
disposition of limited release cases. 8 A line of English decisions
took the most progressive stand and looked to the intent of the
parties in the construction of limited releases. 9 Not until 1915
did an American court join the English trend,2" but even then,
as had been the result of the English cases,"' the court concluded
by construing the limited release as merely a covenant not to sue.
C. Release of One Joint Tortfeasor: The Modem View
The inequities of the common law rule finally began to be supplanted with the enactment by a few enlightened state legislatures
of statutes providing that the application of a release must be con-

15. See, e.g., Ruble v. Turner, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 38 (1808). The court said of the limiting language,
"[tihe proviso . . . is void." Id. at 46.
16. See, e.g., Price v. Barker, 119 Eng. Rep. 281, 287 (1855).
17. See, e.g., McBride v. Scott, 132 Mich. 176, 93 N.W. 243 (1903).
18. One line of cases held that the common law rule could only be applied to technical releases, i.e., releases
under seal. See, e.g., Walker v. McCullock, 4 Me. 421,427 (1827); Shaw v. Pratt, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 305,
308 (1839); Eastman v. Grant, 34 Vt. 387, 390 (1861); Bloss v. Plymake, 3 W. Va. 393, 405 (1869). Another
group of decisions held that whether the plaintiff had realized full satisfaction for his injury was the controlling
consideration in the interpretation of limiting language in releases. See, e.g., Ayers v. Ashmead, 31 Conn.
447, 455 (1863); Thomas v. Maysville Street Railway & Transfer Co., 136 Ky. 446, 451, 124 S.W. 398,
399 (1910); Bailey v. Delta Electric Light, Power & Manufacturing Co., 86 Miss. 634, 637, 38 So. 354, 355
(1905); Russell v. McCall, 141 N.Y. 437, 450, 36 N.E. 498, 502 (1894).
19. See, e.g., Thompson v. Lack, 136 Eng. Rep. 216, 221 (1846); Cocks v. Nash, 131 Eng. Rep. 643,
646 (1832); Solly v. Forbes, 129 Eng. Rep. 871, 875 (1820).
20. Dwy v. Connecticut, 89 Conn. 74, 96, 92 A. 883, 890 (1915).
21. See, e.g., Price v. Barker, 119 Eng. Rep. 281, 287 (1855).
22. Dwy, 89 Conn. at 96, 92 A. at 890.
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sistent with the intent of the parties." In 1939, this position was
sanctioned by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws with its promulgation of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasers Act." Section four of the act provided that a release
of one joint tortfeasor "does not discharge the other tortfeasors
unless the release so provides .. . ." 25 The Restatement of Torts,
published that same year, also recommended the recognition of
limited releases but applied the common law rule if the release
contained no limiting language. "6 The uniform act was revised
in 1955, but the language of section four abrogating the common
law rule was retained." Finally, the Restatement was brought into
full harmony with the uniform act with the publication in 1977
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.28 There it was provided that
"[a] valid release of one tortfeasor . . . does not discharge others
liable for the same harm, unless it is agreed that it will discharge
them." 9 Thus, the effect of both the uniform act and the Restatement is to abolish the common law rule that a release of one joint
tortfeasor releases all unless the parties to the release expressly
invoke the rule.
Section four of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act is now the law in twenty-one states," and an additional thirteen jurisdictions have enacted statutes with provisions substan23. Typical of such statutes was that enacted by the Alabama legislature in 1896: "All receipts, releases
and discharges in writing, whether of a debt of record, or a contract under seal, or otherwise, must have effect
according to the intention of the parties thereto." ALA. CODE § 1805 (1896). See also ALA. COOE § 12-21-109
(Supp. 1986). Despite the plain language of this statute, the Alabama court balked at abandoning the common
law rule 'hat the veleas of one joint tortftasov releases all. Instead, the court tead the statute to mean that
releases must have effect according to the apparent intent of the parties. See, e.g., Harbour v. Poncelor, 203
Ala. 386, 83 So. 130 (1919). The statute continues to have little or no impact on the construction of releases
in Alabama, and that jurisdiction is now among the minority of states which still adheres to the common law
rule. Baker v. Ball, 473 So. 2d 1031 (Ala. 1985).
24. UNtF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, historical note at 12U.L.A. 57 (1975).
25. Id., historical note, § 4.
26. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 885 (I) (1939).
27. UNiF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT, § 4, 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885 (1) (1977).
29. Id.
30. AtASKA STAT. § 09.16.040 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2504 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 34-1004 (1947); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-105 (Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6304
(1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(5) (West .1986); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-14 (1976); IDAhIO CODE §
6-801 to -806 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 70, %302 (SmIth-Hurd Supp. 1986); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50,
§ 19 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231B, § 4 (Law. Co-op. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.245 (1985); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-3-4 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-4 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-04 (1976); Omio
REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(F) (Anderson 1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8326 (Purdon 1982); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 10-6-7 (1956); S.D. CODItIED LAWS ANN. § 15-8-17 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-105
(1980); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-113 (1977). Mississippi and New Jersey have adopted statutes based on the uniform
act, but these statutes do not include equivalents of the uniform act's section four pertaining to releases. See
MIss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-1 to -3 (West 1952).
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tially the same as section four.3 Full credit is given to limiting
language in releases by judicial decision in eight states,32 and the
common law rule still stands in at least three jurisdictions.33
D.

Release of One Joint Tortfeasor: Mississippi Law

In Mississippi, the common law rule that the release of one joint
tortfeasor releases all was effectively abolished with a very early
statute" which survives in the current code. 5 Although the statute deals with the rights of a creditor who releases one joint
debtor, its provisions, as recognized by the court in the instant
case,3 6 are clearly analogous to releases of joint tortfeasors3 7 The
first Mississippi decision expressly dealing with the common law
rule was Bailey v. Delta ElectricLight, Power & Manufacturing
Co. 3' This case, decided in 1905, is the basis of all subsequent
Mississippi decisions on releases of joint tortfeasors. The Bailey
31. CAL. CIv. PROC.CODE § 877 (West 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572e(b) (1985): ME. REV. STAT.

ANN. tit. 14, § 163 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2925d (West 1986); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060
(Supp. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-b (1955); N.Y. GEN. OtLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1978);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 832(H) (West Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-4-4 (1953); VA. CODE §

8.01-35.1 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODEANN. § 4.22.060(2) (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE§ 55-7-12 (1981)
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 113.04 (West 1974).
32. Williams v. Physicians and Surgeons Community Hosp., Inc., 249 Ga. 588, 592, 292 S.E.2d 705,

708 (1982); Sanderson v. Hughes, 526 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Ky. 1975); Landry v. New Orleans Pub. Serv.,
177 La. 105, 112-13, 147 So. 698, 700 (1933); Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 129, 64 N.W.2d 159,
165 (1954); Lee v. Wiley Buntin Adjuster, Inc., 204 So. 2d 479, 482 (Miss. 1967): Scheideler v. Elias, 209
Neb. 601,610, 309 N.W.2d 67, 74 (1981); Breen v. Peck, 28 N.J. 351,364-65, 146 A.2d 665,674 (1958);
McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 196-97 (Tex. 1971).
33. Baker v. Ball, 473 So. 2d 1031, 1036 (Ala. 1985); Cooper v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 271 Ind. 63,
66, 390 N.E.2d 155, 158 (1979); Jacobson v. Parrill, 186 Kan. 467, 475, 351 P.2d 194, 202 (1960).
34. Adopted in 1844, the statute provided in pertinent part:
In all cases of joint, or joint and several indebtedness . .. it shall be lawful for the creditor or creditors . . . to receive from any one or more of the persons so in debted or liable . . . payment . . . and there-

upon to release the person or persons so paying ... and such release shall in no way affect the right of
such creditor or creditors . . . to sue for and recover, the residue of the amount remaining due or unpaid
from the other joint, or joint and several debtors . . . nor shall such release operate as a release of all
or any of the remaining debtors ....
HUTCHINSON'S MISS. CODE ch. 38, art. II (1848). The effect of this statute was to aim the law in the same
direction ultimately suggested by both the Restatement of Torts and the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act nearly acentury later. Ironically, the Mississippi courts failed to realize over the years the applicability of the joint debtor statute to limited release issues, and the instant case marks the first time in its 137 years
on the books that the statute has been applied to a release of a joint tortfeasor.
35. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-1 (1972).
36. Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Miss. 1985).
37. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-1 (1972) provides in pertinent part:
In all cases ofjoint or joint and several indebtedness, the creditor may settle or compromise with and release
any one or more of such debtors; and the settlement or release shall not affect the right or remedy of the
creditor against the other debtors for the amount remaining due and unpaid, and shall not operate to release
saiddebtors
....
any of theother
38. 86 Miss. 634, 38 So. 354 (1905).
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court adopted the reasoning of a prior Kentucky decision, 9 cited
it as primary authority, and rejected the wholesale operation of
the common law rule except in situations where the injured party
had received full satisfaction and compensation from the released
tortfeasor. ° The Bailey rule was followed in a number of cases 1
without further elaboration until 1967 when the Mississippi court
expressly held that which had been implicit in Bailey, namely,
that a release of one joint tortfeasor with a reservation to proceed
against another is valid.2
E.

The Parol Evidence Rule's Exception for Strangers

In considering releases drawn in the absence of the common
law rule, courts are frequently confronted with instruments containing ambiguous terms. Often the terms are unclear as to the
effect of the release on the remaining tortfeasors. Where such ambiguity exists, the courts employ the parol evidence rule to determine the intent of the parties as to the unclear term or terms.
The parol evidence rule provides that testimony which would
supplement, vary, or contradict the terms of a clear and unambiguous writing is inadmissible, but where a term of the writing
is on its face ambiguous, the parties may offer testimony to explain the meaning of the unclear term." By its definition, this rule
applies to controversies between the parties to the contract, but
its application has been otherwise in controversies between a party
and a stranger to the contract. An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, Mississippi among them," have held that the parol evidence rule does not apply to such controversies. 5 The rationale
39. Louisville& Evansville Mail Co. v. Barnes' Adm'r, 117 Ky. 860, 870-74, 79 S.W. 261, 263-64 (1904).
40. 86 Miss. at 637. 38 So. at 355.
41. See, e.g., Gulf Ref. Co. v. Ferrell, 165 Miss. 296, 313, 147 So. 476, 478-79 (1933); Waterman-Fouke
Lumber Co. v.Miles, 135 Miss. 146, 148, 99 So. 759, 760 (1924); Bogdahn v. Pascagoula St. Ry. & Power
Co., 118 Miss. 668, 676, 79 So. 844, 846 (1918).
42. Lee v. Wiley Buntin Adjuster, Inc., 204 So. 2d 479, 481-82 (Miss. 1967).
43. This rule is universally recognized, In Mississippi, the controlling case is Valley Mills v. S.E. Hatcheries, 245 Miss. 71,79, 145 So. 2d 698, 702 (1962). See also Fugua v. Mills, 221 Miss. 436, 450, 73 So.
2d 113, 118-19 (1954) for a broader statement of the rule.
44. The parol evidence rule's exception for strangers was integrated into Mississippi law in the nineteenth
century with Whitney v. Cowan, 55 Miss. 626 (1878). This case has been followed twice prior to the instant
case. National Cash Register Co. v. Webb, 194 Miss. 626, 11 So. 2d 205 (1943); Magruder v. Palmer. 109
Miss. 516, 69 So. 498 (1915).
45. Shelby County v. Baker, 269 Ala. Il1, 125-26, 110 So. 2d 896, 910 (1959); Collins v. Collins, 46
Ariz. 485, 497-99, 52 P.2d 1169, 1174 (1935); Marx v. McKinney, 23 Cal. 2d 439, 442-43, 144 P.2d 353,
355 (1943); Continental Trust Co. v. Johnston, 67 Colo. 592, 594, 188 P. 1112, 1112 (1920); Burke v. Yencsik, 120 Conn. 618, 621, 182 A. 135, 137 (1935); Palmer v. Evans, 81 So. 2d 635, 637 (Fla. 1955); Williams
v. Physicians and Surgeons Community Hosp., 249 Ga. 588, 590, 292 S.E.2d 705, 707-08 (1982); Walter
v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 402 Ill. 33, 41, 83 N.E.2d 346, 351-52 (1949); State Highway Comm'r v. Wilhite,
218 Ind.177, 181, 31 N.E.2d 281, 282 (1941); Kimmel v. Iowa Realty Co, Inc.,
339 N.W.2d 374, 381-82
(Iowa 1983); Fieser v. St. Francis Hosp, & School of Nursing, Inc., 212 Kan. 35, 41, 510 P.2d 145, 151
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supporting this exception is difficult to ascertain. 6 The logic underlying the exception to the rule, or the lack of it, has been roundly attacked by Williston, 7 Corbin," Wigmore,"9 and by a handful
of courts."0 These criticisms ultimately pose the same question:
Why should a party be allowed to disavow the intent clearly
manifested in his writing merely because his dispute is with someone other than a party to the writing?
RATIONALE OF THE COURT

In Smith v. Falke,1 the Mississippi Supreme Court was faced

with a document titled "Full and Final Release of All Claims,"
executed by Smith, the plaintiff, in favor of one of two joint tortfeasors. "The other joint tortfeasor, defendant Falke, claimed pro(1973); Williams v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 157 Ky. 836, 848, 164 S.W. 112, 117 (1914); Chenevert v.
Lemoine, 245 La. 1076, 1076, 161 So. 2d 85, 91 (1964); Boronskis v. Texas Co., 344 Mass. 477, 480, 183
N.E.2d 127, 129 (1962); Sewall v. Feller, 288 Mich. 107, 112-13, 284 N.W. 662, 664 (1939); Housing and
Redev. Auth. v. First Ave. Realty Co., 270 Minn. 297, 300-02, 133 N.W.2d 645, 649 (1965); Nieman v.
First Nat'l Bank of Joplin, 420 S.W.2d 20, 22-23 (Mo. App. 1967); Kussler v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
186 Mont. 82, 88, 606 P.2d 520, 524 (1980); First Nat'l Bank of Wayne v. Tolerton & Stetson, 5 Neb. 43,
44, 97 N.W. 248, 248 (1903); Quinn v. Quinn, 54 Nev. 262, 265-66, 13 P.2d 221, 221 (1932); Stacy v. F.M.
Hoyt Shoe Co., 83 N.H. 281, 287-88, 141 A. 467, 470 (1928); Roehl v. Anderson, 31 N.M. 616, 617-19,
249 P. 1010, 1011 (1926); Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C. 693, 695, 9 S.E.2d 395, 396 (1940);
Zimmer v. Bellon, 153 N.W.2d 757, 762 (N.D. 1967); Bowman v. Tax Comm'n of Ohio, 135 Ohio St. 295,
300-01, 20 N.E.2d 916, 919 (1939); Trane Co. v. Bearden Plumbing and Heating Co., 463 P.2d 350, 352
(Okla. 1969); Edwards v. Wolf, 278 Or. 255, 259-60, 563 P.2d 717, 719 (1977); Badler v. L. Gillarde Sons
Co., 387 Pa. 266, 270-72, 127 A.2d 680, 683 (1956); Nelson v. United Fire Ins. Co. of New York, 275 S.C.
92, 96, 267 S.E.2d 604, 606-07 (1980); Evans v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., 545 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1976); Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 188-91, 72 P.2d 449, 451-52 (1937); McComb v. McComb,
226 Va. 271, 274-76, 307 S.E,2d 877, 879-80 (1983); Witenberg v. Sylvia, 35 Wash. 2d 626, 629, 214 P.2d
690, 692 (1950); Burnett County Abstract Co. v. Eau Claire Citizens' Loan & Inv. Co., 216 Wis. 35, 38,
255 N.W. 890, 891-92 (1934).
46. For an analysis of the difficulties surrounding the rationale of the exception, see infra text accompanying notes 76-81.
47. 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ONTHE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 647 (3d ed. 1961).
48. 3 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ONCONTRACTS § 596 (1960). But Professor Corbin endorses the exception when
used to identify those parties to whom a release applies and those to whom it does not:
In such a case, the offered testimony shows that the claimant did not intend the document to be a discharge
of all his claims or to indicate that he had accepted anything in satisfaction of all of them. For that purpose
it should be admissible in any suit against anybody.
Id. The implication, however, is that this exception would apply where the release is silent as to the remaining
tortfeasors or is in some other way ambiguous. From the context of his discussion, it appears that Professor
Corbin would not apply the exception where the claimant seeks to vary the terms of a release in which he
has expressly discharged all other parties.
49. 9 S. WsmowE, Eviosecx IN TxsAs sc CommoN LAw %2446 (Chadboum ve-. 1991).
50. The leading case is Natrona Power Co. v. Clark, 31 Wyo. 284, 287-90, 225 P. 586, 589 (1924). See
also Akamine & Sons, Ltd. v. Am. Sec. Bank, 50 Haw. 304, 308-11,440 P.2d 262, 265-66 (1968); Atlantic
Northern Airlines, Inc. v. Schwimmer, 12 N.J. 293, 301-02, 96 A.2d 652, 655-56 (1953); Oxford Commercial Corp. v. Landau, 12 N.Y.2d 362, 365-66, 190 N.E.2d 230, 231 (1963); Cannon v. Pearson, 383 S.W.2d
565, 569 (Tex. 1964).
51. 474 So. 2d 1044 (Miss. 1985).
52. See supra note 3.
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tection under the language of this release when Smith brought suit
against him for the injury. Smith maintained that her intent in
granting the release had been to release only the first joint tortfeasor and not Falke. Falke insisted that the language of the release
clearly and unambiguously released the first joint tortfeasor as
well as "all other persons . . . classed as joint tortfeasors...
under laws of Mississippi,"" a class to which he belonged. Falke
argued that in the face of such language, Smith was precluded
by the parol evidence rule from introducing testimony as to her
intent.
The court cited the provisions of a joint debtor statute 54 as analogous to the terms of the release in question and concluded that
Smith's release of the first joint tortfeasor did not automatically
release Falke as well. In further support of this premise, the court
relied on a series of cases holding that the common law rule that
the release of one joint tortfeasor releases all is applicable only
when the injured party has received full and total compensation
for his injury in exchange for his release of the tortfeasor from
liability. "
Next the court addressed Falke's contention that testimony concerning Smith's intent was inadmissible under the parol evidence
rule. After stating the rule56 and the requisite of ambiguity for
the rule to be waived, 7 the court looked to National Cash Register
Co. v. Webb, 8 which followed an earlier Mississippi decision 9
holding that the parol evidence rule applies only to controversies
between the parties to the agreement "and those claiming under
them."6 Falke insisted that he was a third party beneficiary claiming under Smith's release by virtue of its language releasing "all
other persons . . . classed as joint tortfeasors under laws of Mississippi,"61 and that as such he was not a stranger to the agreement. Consequently, he argued, the parol evidence rule applied
according to the definition of the exception as stated in National
Cash Register. Alternatively, Falke cited Burns v. Washington
53. Id.
54. MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-1 (1972).
55. Medley v. Webb, 288 So. 2d 846, 848-49 (Miss. 1974); EmployersMut. Casualty Co. v. Meggs, 229
So. 2d 823, 824-25 (Miss. 1969); Burt v. Duckworth, 206 So. 2d 850, 853 (Miss. 1968); Lee v. Wiley Buntin
Adjuster, Inc., 204 So. 2d 479, 482 (Miss. 1967); Weldon v. Lehmann, 226 Miss. 600, 605, 84 So. 2d 796,
797 (1956).
56. As defined in Valley Mills v. S.E. Hatcheries, 245 Miss. 71, 79, 145 So. 2d 698, 701-02 (1962).
57. As defined in Byrd v. Rees, 251 Miss. 876, 882, 171 So. 2d 864, 867 (1965).
58. 194 Miss. 626, I1 So. 2d 205 (1942).
59.Whitney v. Cowan, 55 Miss. 626 (1878).
60. National Cash Register Co. v. Webb, 194 Miss. 626, 629, I1 So. 2d 205, 205 (1942).
61. See supra note 3.
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Savings,62 where it was held that a stranger to a contract would
be allowed to enforce the promise therein if he could show standing as a beneficiary under the contract.6 The court distinguished
Burns from the instant case insofar as the parties in Burns intended for their promise to benefit the stranger," whereas the parties
to the Smith release did not intend a benefit for Falke."
Thus the court held that the intent of the parties is the controlling consideration in the construction of a release: "[A] party
releases only those parties whom he intends to release."' The court
held that Falke was not a beneficiary of the release under Burns
or National Cash Register since Smith's testimony indicated that
it was not the intention of the parties to the release to make him
a beneficiary."7 Additionally, the court reaffirmed the longstanding Mississippi view that the parol evidence rule applies only to
parties to the agreement and to those claiming thereunder.8
ANALYSIS

A.

Basic Rules of Release Construction

The Mississippi court in Smith v. Falke recognizes the true intent of the parties as the touchstone against which the meaning
and effect of the terms of a release are to be construed. This is
fundamental contract law and is the well-established rule of construction in Mississippi. 9 An equally fundamental tenet of contract law is the principle that the intent of the parties is to be
gathered, where possible, from the whole of the writing' and that
where the terms of the writing "are not contrary to law or public
policy, the courts must enforce them as written."71
But by upholding earlier decisions72 dispensing with the parol
evidence rule in controversies between a party to a contract and
a stranger, the court effectively nullifies in such cases the principle that intent is to be gathered from the whole of the writing and
negates the concept that terms of the agreement, given meaning
62.
63.
64.
65.

251 Miss. 789, 171 So. 2d 322 (1965).
Id. at 796-97, 171 So. 2d at 325.
The court erred in its reading of Bums. See infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1985).
66. Id. at 1047.
67. id.
68. Id. at 1046.
69. Hoerner v. First Nat'l Bank of Jackson, 254 So. 2d 754, 759 (Miss. 1971).
70. Hines Motor Co., Inc. v. Hederman, 201 Miss. 859, 867, 30 So. 2d 70, 72 (1947).
71. World Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. King, 187 Miss. 699, 719, 191 So. 665, 672 (1939).
72. National Cash Register Co. v. Webb, 194 Miss. 626, 629, I1 So. 2d 205, 205 (1942); Magruder v.
Palmer, 109 Miss. 516, 520, 69 So. 498, 498 (1915); Whitney v. Cowan, 55 Miss. 626, 643 (1878).
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according to the whole context of the writing, must be enforced
as written. Instead, the court declares that in contract disputes
involving a stranger to the contract, any extrinsic testimony whatsoever is admissible for the purpose of establishing the intent of
the party in regard to the stranger, even if the intent demonstrated runs counter to the clear meaning of the terms as gathered from
the whole of the writing and even if it directly contradicts an unambiguous term clearly stated therein. The result is that such a
term may be altogether avoided if the party claims it to be misrepresentative of his intent.
The court's disposition of Smith v. Falke displaces another basic
rule of construction: "Prerequisite to the use of rules of construction for adjudicating the intention or meaning of ambiguous instruments is an initial determination that there exists an
ambiguity."" The court concedes that the language of the release
in the present case is clear and unambiguous, yet it nevertheless
admits parol evidence. The question of ambiguity is raised with
the court's citation to Byrd v. Rees.' That case involved a patent
ambiguity, but no such ambiguity was apparent in the language
of Smith's release. Had the court found the language to be unclear, then extrinsic evidence would have certainly been admissible to explain the unclear term. Without an ambiguous writing,
the court had no alternative but to resort to the parol evidence
rule's exception for strangers in order to justify the admission of
Smith's testimony regarding her intent. Since this route was taken
by the court, it can only be concluded that the supreme court,
like the trial court, could find no patent ambiguity in the language
of the release. Thus, the court's election to admit Smith's testimony
under the authority of the parol evidence rule's exception for
73. Seat v. Seal, 312 So. 2d 19, 21 (Miss. 1975) (involving construction of a will).
74. 251 Miss. 876, 171 So. 2d 864 (1965). Defendant Byrd owned two separate businesses, a credit bureau
and a collection agency. Although they were independent enterprises, both businesses occupied the same premises.
Byrd contracted to sell the businesses to plaintiff Rees. The collection agency was transferred to Rees upon
the execution of the sales contract, but transfer of the credit bureau was to be postponed until the death or
retirement of Byrd. The contract provided that in the interim Rees could not move the location of the collection
agency from the premises of the credit bureau without Byrd's consent. Otherwise, the operation of the businesses was to "continue uninterrupted just as though there had been no change of ownership and that such
operation by the Buyers [Rees] shall conform in general to the plan of the operation heretofore in effect." Id.
at 879, 171 So. 2d at 865. After the sale, Byrd announced her intention to move the location of the credit
bureau. Rees sued to enforce the contract, and, after considering parol evidence regarding the intest of the
parties, the trial court issued an injunction enjoining Byrd from moving the credit bureau.
The Byrd contract was facially ambiguous in regard to the dispute. Its terms clearly prevented Rees from
moving the location of the collection agency, but did those terms allow Byrd to move the location of the credit
bureau? Byrd was not specifically precluded from moving the credit bureau, but she was bound to keep its
operation within "the general plan . . . heretofore in effect." What did that mean? Did the "general plan" include the location of the credit bureau? In the face of this patent ambiguity, the court correctly allowed the
parties to offer parol evidence as to intent.
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strangers is a departure from the fundamental principles of construction requiring: (1) that the intent of the parties be gathered,
where possible, from the whole of the writing; 75 (2) that terms
not contrary to law or public policy be enforced as written; 7' and
(3) that means allowing for extrinsic explanation of terms be employed only where ambiguity exists."
B. Lack of Foundationfor the ParolEvidence Rule's Exception
for Strangers
These departures from the basic norms of release construction
would be less objectionable if the court could offer a rational justification for recognizing that the parol evidence rule does not apply
to controversies between a party to the contract and a stranger.
But no such convincing reasoning is to be found in the court's
opinion.
The Mississippi court is not alone in this shortcoming, for
neither has any other court been able to satisfactorily state the
rationale behind this exception. The rationale is rooted in the basic
contract principle that two parties cannot contract in such a way
as would bind a stranger to their agreement: if such a situation
were to arise, then the exception to the rule would allow the
stranger to introduce parol evidence to show that he was in no
way privy to the agreement.' 8 Professor Greenleaf, in his famous
treatise on evidence, 9 rationalized the exception by stating that
the parties
alone are to blame if the writing contains what was not intended, or omits that which it should have contained. It cannot affect third persons, who, if it were otherwise, might be prejudiced by things recited
in the writings, contrary to the truth, through the ignorance, carelessness, or fraud of the parties; and who,
therefore, ought not to be precluded from proving the truth, however contradictory to the written statements of others."

Thus the exception is designed to protect the stranger. But would
not the stranger be protected under the normal operation of the
parol evidence rule? The rule allows testimony in the face of fraud,
mutual mistake, or duress. 1 If the recitation of the contract is contrary to the truth through the ignorance or carelessness of the parties, then the stranger may testify under the rule because there
has been a mutual mistake. Similarly, if the parties have willful75. Hines Motor Co., 201 Miss. at 867, 30 So. 2d at 72.
76. World Fire, 187 Miss. at 719, 191 So. at 672.
77. Seal,
312 So. 2d at21.
78. This rationale was touched upon in The King v. Scammonden, 100 Eng. Rep. 685 (1789). For a general
discussion, see 2 T. STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EvIDENCE 1050-53 (1826).
79. 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EvIDENCE (16th ed. 1899).
80. Id. at § 279.
81. See supra note 43.
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ly included a recitation known by them to be untrue, then fraud
has been committed, and the stranger may offer parol evidence
in accordance with the rule.
The desire that a stranger be protected from being bound by
agreements to which his assent was not given is, of course, proper.
But the exception to the parol evidence rule is altogether unnecessary; the normal operation of the rule affords this protection to
the stranger regardless. The basic concept is that in such situations the stranger should be allowed to disavow the terms of the
writing which, through the fraud or mutual mistake of the parties, appear to bind him.
But when the exception is employed to afford the opportunity
to the parties to the contract to testify against a stranger, the logic
of the exception to the parol evidence rule breaks down. There
can be stated no good reason to support an opportunity for a party
to a contract unaffected by fraud or mutual mistake to introduce
evidence that the writing does not mean what it clearly says. Yet
this is the result when a party to a release is allowed to testify
under the exception that he did not intend a stranger to be released,
even though the terms of the writing are clear that all persons
are released. Allowing such testimony obviously saves the party
to the release from the inequity of the common law rule that the
release of one joint tortfeasor releases all. 8" But allowing such
testimony brings to bear an even greater inequity: the parol evidence rule, which always works to protect those prejudiced by
ambiguous or inaccurate recitation, is utterly abandoned, and the
party to the agreement is allowed to say, to the detriment of the
stranger, that the writing means something other than that which
it clearly says. The exception to the rule changes the parol evidence rule from a shield to a sword. The ultimate effect of recognizing the exception is that no party to a release is truly bound
by its terms when a dispute arises involving a stranger, for the
party may at any time claim that his real intent is not reflected
in the writing.
A majority of courts" have not been dissuaded by the lack of
rational substantiation for the exception and have persisted in holding that the parol evidence rule does not apply to disputes between
a party to a contract and a stranger.

82. For illustrations of this reasoning, see O'Neil v. Nat'l Oil Co., 231 Mass. 20, 28-29, 120 N.E. 107,
110 (1918); Fitzgerald v. Union Stockyards Co., 89 Neb. 393, 402, 131 N.W. 612, 615 (191 I); Nashville

Inter-urban Ry. Co. v. Gregory, 137 Tenn. 422, 437, 193 S.W. 1053, 1056-57 (1917).
83. See supra note 50.
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C. Precedentas Authority for the ParolEvidence Rule's Exception for Strangers

The chief authority for the parol evidence rule's exception for
strangers is that of precedent: the exception is traditional, and today when the courts apply it, they invariably cite history instead
of reason." Precedent is precisely what is relied upon by the court
in Smith v. Falke. Primarily relied upon is NationalCash Register
Co. v. Webb, 5 a prior Mississippi decision which recognized the
parol evidence rule's exception for strangers. In that case, Cor-

pus Juris"6 is cited as authority for the exception along with two
earlier Mississippi cases, Magruder v. Palmer7 and Whitney v.
Cowan.8 Magruderoffers no rationale for the exception but cites

Whitney as authority. 9 Neither does Whitney explain the reasoning behind the exception; rather that decision cites treatises by
Greenleaf 9" and Wharton." None of the authorities cited in either
case sheds any light upon the rationale of the exception to the
rule; instead, they merely state the exception and list those cases
which have stated it before them.
The court in the instant case quotes with emphasis a passage
from the Annotated Law Reports 2 in an attempt to define the rationale of the exception. But this passage only states the argu-

ment that the parol evidence rule does not apply to controversies
involving a stranger to the contract because the rule only applies

to controversies between the parties.9 The passage states the exception in terms of fact and not in terms of legal argument, and
it offers no reason why such should be the rule.

84. By far the favorite authority of the early cases allowing the exception is Greenleaf, but the reasoning
stated there in support of the exception is unconvincing. See supra text following note 78. Otherwise, Greenleaf merely states the exception and cites the few earlier cases applying it. In the later editions of his treatise,
the majority of cases cited as supporting the exception rely on earlier editions of Greenleaf as their authority.
Thus, the reasoning behind the exception becomes, for the most part, circular.
85. 194 Miss. 626, 11 So. 2d 205 (1942).
86. 22 C.J. Evidence § 1725 (1920).
87. 109 Miss. 516, 69 So. 498 (1915). See 194 Miss. at 629, 11 So. 2d at 205.
88. 55 Miss. 626 (1878). See 194 Miss. at 629, 11 So. 2d at 205.
89. 109 Miss. at 520, 69 So. at 498.
90. I S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 279 (16th ed. 1899).
91. 2 F. WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 923 (1876).
92. Annotation, Applicability of Parol Evidence Rule in Favor of or Against One Not a Party to Contract
of Release, 13 A.L.R.3D 313 (1967).
93. Id. at 317.
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D. A Clouded Statement of the United States Supreme Court's
Position on the Exception
The Mississippi court recognizes the United States Supreme
Court as one of "the jurisdictions that have also followed this ra-

tionale. 9 In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,9" Hazeltine was a member of a Canadian patent pool. The members of

the pool conspired against Zenith to reduce its share of the Canadian radio and television market. Zenith settled with three of the
conspiring members and in return granted releases to them and
to their subsidiaries. Zenith then brought an antitrust suit against

Hazeltine to recover damages resulting from Hazeltine's participation in the conspiracy. Although Hazeltine was neither a party

to any of the prior releases nor a subsidiary of any of the parties
thereto, it nevertheless asserted the defense of release, citing the

common law rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases
all. The Supreme Court held that "a party releases only those other

parties whom he intends to release,""6 but the Court prefaced this
holding by explaining that this rule was being adopted because it
is most consistent with the aims and purposes of the treble-damage remedy under the antitrust laws. We
must keep in mind the multistate and multiparty character of much private antitrust litigation; often, defendants who have conspired together must be sued in a number of different States if all are to be reached,
and, while defendants in some States may be willing to enter into settlements, defendants in others may not."

The Court then acknowledged that testimony regarding Zenith's
intent in granting the releases would be allowed "since the parol
evidence rule is usually understood to be operative only as to parties to a document, and Hazeltine here was not a party to the
release."98

Although the Court stated that the intent rule adopted in Zenith
and the exception to the parol evidence rule apparently necessary
for its implementation have been applied in earlier Supreme Court
decisions involving releases rooted in state law,"9 the implication is
94. Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (Miss. 1985).
95. 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
96. Id. at 347.
97. Id. at 346-47.
98. Id. at 347, n.12.
99. Id. at 344. The earlier cases which the Court cites deal wholly with the broad application of the common law rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all. See Chicago and Alton R.R. Co. v. Wagner,
239 U.S. 452, 456-57 (1915); United States V. Price, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 83, 92 (1850); and Hunt v, Rhodes, 26
U.S. ( Pet.) 1, 16 (1828). The exception to the parol evidence rule is an issue in none of these cases, and intent
of the parties is addressed only to the extent of fraud, mistake, or surprise. In Hwtt, the Court recognized the power
of equity to correct a mistake in an instrument 'which violates the manifest intention of the parties to the agreement."
26 U.S. (I Pet.) I at 13. The Court nevertheless held that equity will not reform a release violative of the parties'
intent where such violation results from the parties' "manifest misapprehension of the legal effect of [the release],
at 16.There is no language in any of these cases to suggest a rule so sweeping
inrelation to the other obligors." Id.
as that which declares that a party releases only those whom he intends to release.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:189

clear that the exception to the parol evidence rule was allowed
in Zenith in order to resolve a matter in a particularly troublesome area of the law, namely, private antitrust litigation." 0 It is
doubtful whether the Court would extend the exception to a matter outside this narrow application. Indeed, Wigmore, whom the
Court cites... as a general reference on the exception to the rule,
dismisses the exception as "not sound on principle."' Thus, the
Mississippi Supreme Court's application of Zenith to the facts in
Smith v. Falke is too far removed from the original context of
Zenith to render that decision a source of well-reasoned support
regarding the parol evidence rule's exception for strangers.
E. Claiming Under a Release as a Third-Party Beneficiary
The Mississippi court also misreads the facts of Burns v.
Washington Savings,"' cited inthe instant decision to reject appellant Falke's contention that he was a third-party beneficiary
under the Smith release and therefore protected by the parol evidence rule from Smith's testimony as to her intent in granting the
5 The court distinguishes the facts in the present case from
release."°
those in Burns by stating that "[t]he Burns court found, under the
terms of the contract, that the parties intended to include the third
party as a beneficiary, and this accordingly, afforded a third-party
beneficiary rights to enforce a claim under the contract."' Actually, the Burns court found exactly the opposite; the finding there
was that the parties did not intend to include the plaintiff as a thirdparty beneficiary.' In reaching this conclusion, the Burns court
employed a three-part test to determine the validity of the plaintiffs claim as a third-party beneficiary. The test provided that:
(1) When the terms of the contract are expressly broad enough to include the third party either by name
as one of a specified class, and
(2) the said third party was evidently within the intent of the term so used, the said third party will be
within its benefits, if
(3) the promisee had, in fact, a substantial and articulateinterest in the welfare of the said third party
in respect to the subject of the contract.'

This test might well have been applied to the facts in Smith v.
Falke. Part one of the test is met insofar that Falke was obviously a member of the class of "joint tortfeasers under laws of
100. 401 U.S. at 346-47. See also Kussler v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 186 Mont. 82, 88, 606 P.2d 520,
524 (1980) (interpreting Zenith as limited to antitrust litigation).
101. 401 U.S. at 347 n.12.
102. 9 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2446 (3d ed. 1940).
103. 251 Miss. 789, 171 So. 2d 322 (1965).
104. 474 So. 2d at 1047.
105. Id.
106. 251 Miss. at 798, 171 So. 2d at 326.
107. Id. at 797, 171 So. 2d at 325 (emphasis added).
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the test is
met insofar as the intent, as evidenced by the terms of the writing, was to include that specified class of joint tortfeasors; but
part three of the test is not met by the facts of the case, for the
promisee of the release, Gunter, had no substantial or articulate
interest in the welfare of the third party, Falke. 0 9 Thus, under
the Burns test, Falke can at best only be considered an "incidental beneficiary""' under the release and not a third-party beneficiary
"within the intent, terms, and meaning"' thereof. To ascertain
the standing of an incidental beneficiary, Burns relied on an earlier
Mississippi case... which held that "a mere incidental beneficiary
acquires by virtue of the contractual obligation no right against
the promisor or the promisee.""' It is readily seen, then, that the
central issue of the instant case could have been easily resolved
had the court applied the test in Burns. The test works to ascertain the true intent of Smith and Dairyland in executing the release
so far as it touches Falke, and at the same time it dispenses with
any claim by Falke of a right to enforce the release to his advantage. Most importantly, for the purposes of the present case, utilization of the Burns test settles the matter without resort to the
parol evidence rule's exception for strangers." '
F. The Problem of "Boilerplate"Language
Disputes arising over the scope of releases in personal injury
cases invariably find their origin in the "boilerplate" language of
preprinted forms. The release in Smith v. Falke, providing for
the release of all "persons, corporations, and entities whatsoever,"" 5 presents a classic illustration of such "boilerplate" language. Like the Mississippi court in the present case, courts are
eager to avoid literal compliance with such terms where a stranger
to the release attempts to claim immunity under it. Thus, there
is the common resort to the parol evidence rule's exception for
strangers to allow the releasor the opportunity to explain his true
intent.
108. See supra note 3.
109. While it is true that extrinsic evidence would be required to establish the relationship between Gunter
and Falke, such evidence would not be offered to supplement, vary, or contradict the terms of the release.
Instead, this evidence would be admitted in accordance with the Burms test to determine standing as a beneficiary.
Parts one and two of the Burns test look to the terms of the release in a "four corners" approach which obviates
the need for parol evidence. Part three is a factual detteminatii nre"lated to the terms of ftermkease. Thus,
the parol evidence rule never comes into play under the Burns test.
110. Burns, 251 Miss. at 798, 171 So. 2d at 326.
111. Id.

112. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.Hewes, 190 Miss. 225, 199 So. 93 (1940).
113. Burns, 251 Miss. at 798, 171 So. 2d at 326 (emphasis added); seealso Hartford, 190 Miss. at 234,
199 So. at 95.
114. See supra note 107.
115. See supra note 3.
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The Alaska Rule

One approach to avoiding unintended consequences of "boilerplate" terms - an approach which remains true to the parol evidence rule - is the adoption of the rule of construction that a
party releases only those specifically named in the release. This
innovative approach was first promulgated by the Alaska Supreme
Court "' and has been subsequently followed by the highest courts
in Illinois,"1 ' Ohio, 18 Texas, " and Wyoming °
The Alaska Supreme Court case, Young v. State, involved a
one-car automobile accident in which a passenger was injured.
The passenger released the driver of the car in addition to "all
other persons, corporations, firms, associations or partnerships
of and from any and all claims." ' 1 The passenger then brought
an action against the State of Alaska for allegedly failing to post
warning signs advising of the hazards of a temporary one-lane
bridge on the two-lane state road on which the accident occurred.
The state pleaded the defense of release, and the trial court dismissed the complaint. The supreme court reversed. 2
After analyzing the development of the common law rule that
a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all and the various modem
approaches to the rule,"3 the court held that "the rule which will

bring most clarity to this area of ambiguous and conflicting release
rules is one under which a release of one tortfeasor does not release
the other joint tortfeasors unless such tortfeasors are specifically
named in the release." 2 ' The court noted that "the adoption of
this rule will insure that the intent of the parties to the release
is given effect and will greatly minimize the possibility of any
party being misled as to the effect of the release."125 The court
then concluded that the pre-printed language of the release in ques116. Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969).
117. Aslup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101 Ill. 2d 196, 199-200, 461 N.E.2d 361, 364 (1984).
118. Beck v. Cianchetti, I Ohio St. 3d 231, 235, 439 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1982).
119. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Tex. 1984).
120. Bjork v. Chrysler Corp., 702 P.2d 146, 156 (Wyo. 1985). Additionally, the Georgia court has adopted
a variant of the Alaska rule in Williams v. Physicians and Surgeons Community Hosp., 249 Ga. 588, 592,
292 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1982). Williams held that the use of "boilerplate" language in a release raises the presumption
that only the parties specifically named or identified therein are released. 249 Ga. at 592, 292 S.E.2d at 708.
This presumption may be rebutted by parol evidence, and to this extent Williams is a significant departure
from the Alaska rule.
121. Young, 455 P.2d at 890.
122. Id.at 893.
123. The Young court identified three prevailing approaches: (1) the common law rule, (2) the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors position, and (3) the first Restatement of Torts position. See supra text accompanying notes 11-29.
124. Young, 455 P.2d at 893.
125. Id.
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tion did not specifically name the State of Alaska and was therefore insufficient to work as a release of that party.' 6
Two years later the Supreme Court of Texas, in McMillen v.
Klingensmith, '7 expressly adopted the Alaska rule with one modification: "We hold that the release of a party or parties named or
otherwise specifically identified fully releases only the parties so
named or identified, but no others.' 28 The court recognized as
among the chief virtues of the Alaska rule its simplicity, equity,
ease of application, and the consequential avoidance of the many
"problems arising from the present rule which often requires proof
by parol evidence of the releasor's subjective intent at the time
the release was executed."' 29
But the qualification tacked on the rule by the Texas court, "or
otherwise specifically identified," proved to yield inconsistent
results when applied by the lower courts. In a 1980 Texas Court
of Appeals case, Bell v. FirstNational Bank in Dallas, ° a stranger
claimed protection under a release granted to a named party and
to "anyand all otherpersons, firms or corporations. . . . ""' The
court held that "although the . . [stranger] is not expressly named

in the foregoing release, the intent is clear to include it as one
of the 'other persons, firms or corporations ...

,,1

Thus, the

stranger was found to be "'otherwise specifically identified

.

.

.'

"133

However, in Duke v. Brookshire Grocery Co. ,'3 an earlier intermediate appellate decision, identical "boilerplate" language was
interpreted differently. There a stranger claimed under a release
covering a named party as well as "any other persons, firms or
corporations."'35 The court acknowledged that the stranger was
not named in the release and found "that the phrase 'and any other
persons, firms or corporations' is only general identification at
best and does not fall within the term 'otherwise specifically3 6identified' as used" in the Texas version of the Alaska rule.
126. Id.
127. 467 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1971). A passenger injured in an automobile accident released the driver of
the car and later sued a physician for alleged negligent treatment of her injuries. Although the release in McMillen
contained no "boilerplate" language as did the release in Young, the physician nevertheless claimed the defense
of release under the common law rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all. The physician prevailed
at both the trial court and the court of appeals, but the supreme court reversed.
128. Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. 597 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980).
131. Id. at 522 (emphasis in original).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 568 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
135. Id. at 471.
136. Id. at 472.
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These inconsistent rulings were resolved in 1984 by the Supreme
Court of Texas in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co." 7 The court
sided with the Duke decision and overruled Bell. The supreme
court held that
the mere naming of a geiteral class of tortfeasors in a release does not discharge the liability of each member of that class. A tortfeasor can claim the protection of a release only if the release refers to him by
name or with such descriptive particularity that his identity or his connection with the tortious event is
not in doubt.'

The incorporation of the Alaska rule into Illinois and Ohio law
was not effectuated by express adoption of Young and Duncan.
Rather, those courts arrived at the approval of the Alaska rule
via interpretation of state statutes based upon section four of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. 3 ' The crucial language construed in each of these cases.4 ° is section four's provision that a release "does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors
from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms
so provide."' In each case, the release in question was a standard preprinted form containing the usual "boilerplate' language."'
In Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. ,' the Illinois court
concluded that the legislative intent behind the statutory language
was to require that no party is released unless "designated by name
or otherwise specifically identified."' 4 To hold otherwise, the court
reasoned, would be to frustrate "the legislative intendment of nullifying the common law rule."'4
Alsup relied heavily on the Ohio court's decision in Beck v. Cianchetti. '6 In its analysis of legislative intent, the Beck court stated
that the purpose of the statute was to preclude "entrapp[ing] the
average person into reasonably assuming that settling a claim with
one person would have no effect upon rights against others with
whom he did not deal."' 47
Thus the court held that the statute contemplated express
8 desigdescription.
specific
other
or
released
those
of
nation
137. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
138. Id. at 419-20.
139. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 302 (1986); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(F) (Page 1981).
2d 196, 461 N.E.2d 361 (1984); Beck v. Cianchetti,
140. Alsup v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 101 I11.
I Ohio St.3d 231, 439 N.E.2d 417 (1982).
ACT § 4(a), 12U.L.A. 98 (1975) (emphasis added). The
141. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
crucial phrase in the Ohio statute is "unless its terms otherwise provide." OHto REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.32(F)(1)
(Page 1981).
142. Beck, I Ohio St. 3d at 232, 439 N.E.2d at 418; Alsup, 101 II. 2d at 200, 461 N.E.2d at 363.
143. 101Ill. 2d 196, 461 N.E.2d 361 (1984).
144. Id. at 201, 461 N.E.2d at 364.
145. Id.
146. 1 Ohio St. 3d 231, 439 N.E.2d 417 (1982).
147. Id. at 235, 439 N.E.2d at 420.
148. Id.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Bjork v. Chrysler Corp., 149
considered at length the rationale of Alsup and Beck together with
the reasoning of Young and Duncan in arriving at its decision to
adopt the Alaska rule. Bjork concluded that, with or without a
statute,"' the construction of releases saddled with "boilerplate"
language demands deference to the intent of the parties. The court
considered the Alaska rule to be the approach best suited to facilitate determination of intent and construed Wyoming's statute as
a legislative enactment of the Alaska rule.'
While it has its virtues,.. 2 the Alaska rule is not without its
problems. The main objection to the rule is that it effectively prohibits general releases by requiring that releasees be specifically
named. Should a party desire to release certain joint tortfeasors
whose identities are unknown, such could only be accomplished
with the use of standard "boilerplate" language. This objection
is particularly applicable where the Alaska rule has been read into
section four of the uniform act. Because section four does not
require that releasees be specifically named,' the act should not
be interpreted as absolutely precluding general releases."' Also
well-founded is the criticism that such an interpretation of section four constitutes an invasion by the courts of authority reserved
for the legislature.'
2.

The Florida Rule

Florida is another jurisdiction which has addressed the importance of remaining true to the intent of the parties in construing
releases with standard "boilerplate" language. But in Hurt v.
Leatherby Ins. Co. ,"56 the Florida court declined to adopt the Alas-

ka rule, either as a strict rule of construction 157 or as an interpretation of Florida's version of section four of the uniform act.'
149. 702 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1985).
150. In Bjork, WYo. STAT. § I-I-113 (1985), based upon section four of the uniform act, was interpreted

in accordance with Beck and Alsup.
151. 702 P.2d at 163.
152. The chief virtue of the Alaska rule is its simplicity. See supra text accompanying note 125. Theoretically, the rule should greatly diminish the need for litigation over the meaning of"boilerplate" terms in releases

since a stranger would have to concede that where he is not specifically named or identified with certainty
therein, the release has no application to him.
153. Section four provides that a release "does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for
the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide." UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
ACT

§ 4(a), 12 U.L.A. 98 (1975).
154. Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1980).
155. Bjork, 702 P.2d at 164 (Rooney, J.,dissenting); Beck, I Ohio St. 3d at 237, 439 N.E.2d at 422
(Holmes, J.,dissenting).
156. 380 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1980).
157. Id. at 434.
158. Id. at 433. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(5) (West Supp. 1985)provides that a release ofonejoint tortfeasor does not release the others "unless its terms so provide."
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Instead, the court sought an approach consistent with traditional
rules of contract interpretation.159 Noting that there is nothing patently ambiguous about language in a release given in favor of
a named party and "any other person, corporation, association
or partnership," 6 ' the Florida court acknowledged that under sound
rules of contract construction, parol evidence would be inadmissible to vary the plain meaning of such language.6
In Hurt, the release was a standard preprinted form with blanks
provided for the names of the parties; these names were written
into the form, while the all-inclusive "boilerplate" language was
part of the preprinted text. 6 ' The court held that the written terms
and the printed terms constituted "two types of releases,""63 and
that the printing and writing, when combined into a single form,
"creates at least a latent ambiguity."'6 4 Having found this latent
ambiguity, the court thus opened the way for the introduction of
parol evidence as to intent.
Instead of inventing new rules of construction, the Florida rule
works within the bounds of time-tested principles of contract construction while affording primary consideration to the intent of
the parties. Intent is disclosed through parol evidence, admitted
in accordance with the parol evidence rule in the face of latent
ambiguity.
The Florida rule does not prohibit general releases as does the
Alaska rule. If a party's intent in executing a release is to give
effect to "boilerplate" terms, then such terms will be enforced under
the Florida rule. "Boilerplate" language can never be given effect
under the Alaska rule, despite the intent of the parties, because
of its requirement that released parties be specifically identified.
Because it works to accommodate the true intent of the parties
under any circumstances, the Florida rule is to be preferred over
the Alaska rule as a means of resolving disputes rooted in "boilerplate" release terms. In addition to its flexibility, the Florida rule
should be favored for its use of widely-recognized principles of
contract construction as well as for its proper use of parol evidence. Finally, the Florida rule avoids questionable interpretation of section four of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, yet it can be implemented harmoniously with
159.
intent.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

The court particularly noted the rule that the language of a release is the best evidence of the parties'
380 So. 2d at 433. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
380 So. 2d at 433.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 434.
Id.
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statutes based on65section four, as is evidenced by the rule's adoption in Florida.1
CONCLUSION

The objection to the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision in
Smith v. Falke lies not in its ultimate disposition of the case. Indeed, the desirable result is reached, for as the court observes,
equity would not be served had the court compelled "a construction of the settlement instrument to benefit a wrongdoer who was
66
a stranger to the instrument and paid no consideration for it.'
Rather the objection lies in the means employed to reach this end.
The court identifies the intent of the parties as the controlling
factor in the construction of the release. There can be little question that discerning the parties' intent is the ideal, but the court's
statement that a party releases only those whom he intends to
release is of little help. A method by which to ascertain that intent is essential. 7
To that end, the court endorses admission of parol evidence
to explain intent. Because the release was patently unambiguous,'68
the court, to justify the admission of parol evidence, resorts to
the parol evidence rule's exception for strangers. The court fails
to offer any logical rationale in support of this exception, and it
cites as authority only the weight of precedent and not that of reason. 169 The exception endorsed by the court has been forcefully
criticized by writers and by courts, 7 ° and this criticism has not
been refuted either by the Mississippi court in the7 present case
or by any other court recognizing the exception.' '
Concisely stated, the problem is one of determining how to enforce the true intent of the parties where "boilerplate" language
in the release works against that intent and how to resolve the
issue without resort to the parol evidence rule's exception for
strangers, an unsound legal doctrine.
165. Section four of the uniform act is in force in Florida under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31(5) (West Supp.
1985).
166. Smith v. Falke, 474 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Miss. 1985).
167. Since its decision in Smith v. Falke, the Mississippi Court has again dealt with the problem of boilerplate language in standard release forms. In Country Club of Jackson, Miss. v. Saucier, 498 So. 2d 337 (Miss.
1986), the court restated the broad rule of Smith v. Falke, that a party releases only those whom he intends
to release. While the court made passing mention of the Alaska rule and Alsup, no guidelines were offered
for discerning the releasor's intent. Instead, Country Club was decided under the Burns test for third-party
beneficiaries, and, as in Smith v. Falke, the court misstates the holding in Burns. 498 So. 2d at 339. See supra
text accompanying notes 101-04.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
170. Id.
171. See supra note 82.
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The best answers to this "question of great public interest"""2
have been advanced by the courts of Alaska.7 . and Florida. 7 ' The
Alaska rule promulgates a new standard for the construction of
"boilerplate" releases.""5 Section four of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act has been interpreted by some courts
as the legislative embodiment of the Alaska rule."' The Florida
rule seeks to solve the same problem through the employment
of traditional rules of contract construction.'
Although, between the two alternatives, the Florida rule is the
better approach, utilization of either would have provided the same
result as was reached by the Mississippi court in Smith v. Falke,
and either would have been preferable to the court's reliance on
the parol evidence rule's exception for strangers, which compromises the integrity of the parol evidence rule.
The parol evidence rule is one of the most venerable rules of
the law; the rule has been proven in countless cases to yield fair
results to all concerned when applied according to its terms. Any
approach to the construction of contracts which in any way compromises the rule's integrity should be summarily rejected.
A.L. Alvis, III

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 380 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1980).
Young v. State, 455 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1969).
Hurt, 380 So. 2d at 432.
See supra text accompanying notes 114-35.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-48.
See supra text accompanying notes 153-61.

